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human rights violation.  The UN text is thus a useful base for 
developing the law in the future, with the aim of ensuring reparations 
for all victims of human rights violations. 
E. Darren Hutchinson59 
It is hard to go last, especially when there have been many good 
presentations.  I find myself in a difficult situation talking about the 
United States’ domestic law on reparations.  As the other panelists 
have demonstrated, international human rights law on this issue is 
complicated, even where formal structures permit claims of redress.  
In the United States domestic law context, however, no coherent, 
organized, sustained body of legislation deals with reparations as 
such.  Instead, the reparations movement in the United States has 
consisted of individuals, discrete groups of individuals, or social 
movements making claims before state and federal lawmakers and 
courts for remediation of collective harms that they or their ancestors 
have experienced.  Accordingly, in the United States context, we see 
appeals to common law, statutory law, and constitutional law as a 
basis for group remediation, and typically, these claims reach back 
into periods of history, rather than focusing on contemporary acts of 
injustice. 
The lack of a precise definition of “reparations” also complicates 
the situation in the United States.  International law, however, offers 
some interesting insight on this issue.  Furthermore, general trends 
have emerged in jurisprudence and scholarship on this issue.  From 
this research and international analogues, reparations are commonly 
viewed as judicial or legislative remedies for sustained past or present 
injustice towards a particular group.  The essence of reparations is 
remediation for collective harms. 
One final point complicates the United States’ situation (and this 
subject did not receive much attention from the other panelists):  
how far into the past should state actors reach to remedy injustice?  
Culturally, in the United States’ system, discussion of reparations 
typically centers around issues pertaining to slavery and Native 
American land claims.  Although I generously support remediation of 
prior and ongoing injustice, reparations claims raise difficult matters 
including:  (1) defining the class of “injured” people; (2) explaining 
why this present-day class is in fact injured when the actions upon 
                                                          
 59. Darren Hutchinson is a Professor of Law at American University Washington 
College of Law.  His areas of expertise include constitutional law, and Equal Protection 
Theory and equitable remedies. 
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which remediation is based took place in the past; and 
(3) considering whether some forms of remediation—for example, 
land redistribution—present fairness questions when implemented 
today.  Although I agree with reparations advocates that compelling 
arguments justify the provision of reparations, these questions still 
form a legitimate part of the debate. 
In this talk, I will provide a general overview of reparations 
discourse in the United States and offer some suggestions concerning 
how advocates of reparations might frame their claims.  First, I will 
identify some of the policies that one might consider when 
advocating reparations in the U.S. context.  As a remedies professor, I 
will invoke remedies law (judicial remedies doctrine) as an analogy 
for this discussion.  Remedies law provides a helpful framework for 
thinking about reparations in the legislative context, and this subject 
matter necessarily shapes claims for reparations made in a judicial 
setting. 
Second, I will examine some of the political and legal barriers to 
reparations in the United States.  Reparations for racial injustice, in 
particular, are hindered by a common perception among many 
whites who see the United States as having attained equal opportunity 
and who view current racial inequality as a product of the lack of 
initiative among persons of color.  Many whites also embrace 
remediation so long as they do not feel that they are potentially 
impacted by policies to remedy racial oppression. 
Finally, I will discuss my personal preference for structural 
legislative remedies, as opposed to discrete, compensatory, and 
judicial remedies for past injustices.  I hope to demonstrate that in 
terms of providing redress, structural reforms offer the best hope for 
broader improvement in the social and economic status of oppressed 
people in the United States. 
1. What are “reparations”?:  A remedies law analogy 
Proponents of reparations have framed their claims for redress 
around a variety of forms of relief, but their claims often include 
monetary compensation.  Remedies law, or the body of doctrines and 
statutory rules the courts apply when supplying relief to litigants, 
provides a helpful structure for thinking about the range of possible 
instruments that might serve to redress prior, collective injustice.  
Remedies law identifies several categories of redress for litigants.  
Damages compensate for harm.  Restitution removes the ill-gotten 
gains from the defendant and returns them to the plaintiff.  
Structural remedies seek to reform important social institutions to 
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bring them into compliance with legal norms.  Also, ordinary 
injunctions prohibit future harms or rectify prior injustice.  These 
different baskets of remedies can serve as a prism for thinking about 
reparations either as a legislative or as a judicial tool. 
The historical and contemporary debates surrounding remedies in 
the United States demonstrate the relevance of the remedies analogy.  
For example, Japanese-Americans who were interned during World 
War II received monetary compensation for their injuries.  
Restitution has been a form of relief sought by individuals in 
reparations cases, as in litigation seeking disgorgement of profits of 
companies that benefited from slavery.  And as early as 
Reconstruction, some former slaves demanded land and subsistence 
from plantation owners as a way of restoring the unjust gains of 
coerced labor and oppression.  Also, during the Civil War and 
continuing into the earlier parts of Reconstruction, Congress created 
the Freedmen’s Bureau, which distributed (with varying degrees of 
success and intensity) food, education, health care, legal services, and 
other important benefits to the freed slaves.  Finally, in terms of 
injunctions, the post-Civil War era produced a body of constitutional 
provisions and statutory enactments designed to prevent future 
harms and rectify prior injustice. 
2.  Political and legal barriers to reparations 
An important part of the debate over reparations in the U.S. 
context centers upon political and legal constraints.  One element of 
contention concerns remediation of historical wrongs.  Opponents to 
reparations argue that the injustices addressed by contemporary 
reparations movements, particularly for slavery and Jim Crow laws, 
took place in the remote past.  Accordingly, they often view 
remediation as an unfair “punishment” of innocent individuals and 
an undeserved benefit to potential recipients of redress. 
Additionally, the U.S. electorate tends to disfavor economic 
redistribution generally.  Because reparations advocates 
simultaneously demand redistribution and seek to rectify prior 
wrongs, their claims receive very little public support, as opinion data 
persistently confirm. 
One thing that I find interesting in this debate is the failure of the 
opponents of reparations to treat remedies for gross human rights or 
civil rights deprivations as a public good, rather than as a series of 
private transactions that benefit or burden individuals.  If we view 
rectifying prior and current injustice as a public good (that improves 
human capital or that fortifies our national commitment to justice, 
TRANSCRIPTS.OFFTOPRINTER.DOC 8/6/2007  10:14:33 PM 
2007]  REPARATIONS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 1405 
etc.), then reparations can lose their individuated character.  Seen in 
this light, reparations also become compelling for contemporary 
society, despite the passage of time between the wrongdoing and the 
remediation.  If historical wrongs burden society today, then one 
could make a compelling argument to support contemporary redress. 
3.  Structural/legislative relief 
In the little time that remains, I will discuss why I prefer legislative 
reparations over a litigation strategy.  A litigation model provides very 
little hope for success in this area.  First, in terms of the Supreme 
Court, public opinion serves as a powerful constraint upon Court 
rulings.  Furthermore, the Court has defined rights and equality as 
protecting individuals rather than groups.  Accordingly, groups face a 
difficult time pressing claims of injustice or convincing the Court that 
they require judicial solicitude.  Moreover, equal protection doctrine 
requires that plaintiffs prove that governmental defendants acted 
intentionally to create harm.  While many foreign jurisdictions, 
including international human rights structures, define inequality 
around intent or effects, federal court doctrine in the United States 
tends to dismiss evidence of disparate effects, which makes many 
conditions of extreme inequality (unequal distribution of educational 
resources, disparities in the administration of criminal justice, etc.) 
beyond judicial invalidation. 
In addition to these doctrinal and institutional constraints, the 
litigation model also fails because it distorts the impact of broad 
abuses of human and civil rights.  Litigation attempts to provide a 
particularized remedy to a discrete plaintiff or class of plaintiff for 
identifiable, contemporary activity.  While this model might help to 
rectify some instances of injustice, on many levels it obfuscates the 
injurious nature of oppression, which creates pervasive and dispersed 
harms rather than discrete and particularized injuries.  Litigation 
suggests that reparations implicate private harms and individualized 
wrongdoing, which simply reinforces the negative perception of 
reparations as a burden upon or unearned handout to individuals 
rather than as a benefit to society. 
Legislation can better respond to the dispersed nature of the 
harms associated with oppression and provide the deep structural 
reform necessary to rectify social injustice and to invest in human 
capital.  Along these lines, Alfred Brophy, who writes extensively on 
reparations in the U.S. context, has proposed a community “social 
welfare” model for framing reparations discussions, which 
deemphasizes litigation.  Instead, he focuses on seeking legislation 
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that creates institutions that deliver resources to individuals who, due 
to past or current injustices, cannot adequately navigate and access 
these resources in the absence of governmental assistance.  Due to 
the time constraints of today’s panel, I am unable to elaborate on the 
content of Brophy’s proposal or of similar writings, but this approach 
more accurately captures the structural nature of subordination, 
emphasizes the importance of sustained legislative treatment of prior 
and ongoing injustice, and demonstrates the limitations of private 
litigation strategies. 
III. LAWYERING FOR REPARATIONS:  INTER-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 
A. Agustina Del Campo60 
My presentation today will address a slightly different issue than 
what other panelists have been addressing this morning.  The analysis 
of reparations in the inter-American human rights system has mostly 
been focused on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, rather 
than the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.  In fact, the 
Commission’s recommendations are hardly ever addressed in 
research studies dealing with reparations for international human 
rights violations. 
My presentation will be divided in two parts.  First, I will briefly 
summarize the general competence of the Commission and its 
practice in affording remedies and reparations for victims under the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man;61 then I will 
discuss challenges to the litigation of Lorenzo Enrique Copello Castillo v. 
Cuba,62 a case that we brought with Washington College of Law’s 
(“WCL”) Impact Litigation Project before the Commission in 2003 
and was decided in November 2006. 
Going to the first part of my presentation, the Commission is one 
of the two supervisory organs of the inter-American system for the 
protection of human rights.  It was created in 1959 and was 
incorporated into the Charter of the OAS as one of its main organs in 
1960.  With the adoption of the American Convention on Human 
                                                          
 60. Agustina Del Campo, J.D., LL.M., is Coordinator of the Impact Litigation 
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 61. Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, art. XVIII, 1948, O.A.S. Off. Rec., OEA/Ser.L./V./II.23, doc. 21 rev. 
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